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In  many rea l  life s i tuat ions ,  we have  to draw con-  
c lus ions f rom data  wh ich  are  not  complete  and  
have  been a f fected  by meashrement  er rors .  Such  
prob lems have  been addressed  f rom the  t ime of 
Bayes  and  Lap lace  ( late 1700's)  us ing concepts  
wh ich  para l le l  Bo l t zmann 's  use of  ent ropy  in ther -  
ma l  physics .  The  idea is to  ass ign probab i l i t ies  
to d i f ferent  poss ib le  conc lus ions  f rom a g iven set 
of data .  A cr i t ica l  - and  somet imes  cont rover -  
sial - input  is a 'pr ior  p robab i l i ty ' ,  wh ich  repre -  
sents  our  knowledge before  any  data  are  g iven  or 
taken!  Th is  body  of ideas is in t roduced in th is  
ar t ic le  w i th  s imple  examples .  
From the earliest times, thinkers have recognised two 
distinct ways of learning about the world we live in. Our 
educational system gives prominence to the first one - 
'deduction'. The best example is of Course Euclid's con- 
struction of geometry from a few innocent looking ax- 
ioms. In the world of fiction, Sherlock Holmes claimed 
to 'deduce' what had really happened in a crime from 
a few clues. But in reality, what most of us (Sherlock 
Holmes included) practise, should be called ' induction'. 
Logicians have given this name to drawing conclusions 
from observations or experiments by a rather different 
process. To start with, we have a large number of possi- 
ble hypotheses to choose from. Observations and exper- 
imental data are used to narrow down the possibilities. 
The word 'hypothesis' is being used in a rather simple 
sense here. For example, if we are trying to determine 
the elliptical orbit of an asteroid, the 'hypothesis' is just 
a set of numbers giving the plane of the orbit, the size 
and shape and orientation of the ellipse in this plane, 
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Figure 1. The (unknown) 
orbit of the asteroid is 
shown by dashed lines. At 
three different times t~, t2, t~ 
observations give the three 
directions (but not dis- 
tances) of ErA 1, E 2 A 2, and 
E3A 3. Theearth's orbitEIE 2 
E 3 is assumed known. 
and where the asteroid sits on the ellipse at a given 
time. We do not directly measure these numbers but 
rather the angular position in the sky at different times, 
as seen from the earth which is itself a moving platform. 
The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Gauss faced precisely this problem of orbit determina- 
tion in the year 1801. A few observations of Ceres, the 
very first asteroid discovered, were available. He in- 
vented the so called 'method of least squares' to choose 
the best orbit consistent with the measurements avail- 
able. We now explain how his method fits in with our 
earlier general discussion. To simplify matters, we will 
assume, as in Figure 1, that the two orbits, of earth and 
asteroid, lie in a plane. We show in Figure 2 two kinds of 
graphs. One, made up of individual points, gives the ob- 
servations. The continuous curves, give the predictions 
of different possible orbits (i.e., hypotheses). 
Our first reaction is that it needs only four numbers to 
specify the orbit in the plane. These could be the x and y 
coordinates of the asteroid, and the x and y components 
of its velocity, at a given time (January 1, 1801, for 
example!). Four measurements ought to be enough, and 
we should be able to deduce the orbit without guesswork. 
Gauss invented 
the so called 
'method of least 
squares' to choose 
the best orbit 
consistent with the 
measurements 
available. 
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Figure 2. The points show 
the actual observations. 
The continuous curve A 
shows what we might re- 
gard as the best orbit. B is 
another orbit at a greater 
distance than A. The verti- 
cal lines through the ob- 
served points represent 
errors of measurement. 
lO 
Measurements are 
never exact, and 
the points would 
not lie exactly on 
the predicted curve 
even if we knew 
the orbiN 
But Gauss, a lthough the prince of mathematic ians,  also 
knew the real world better. Measurements are never 
exact, and the points would not lie exactly on the pre- 
dicted curve even if we knew the orbit! We can state this 
in another way. For each measurement,  we can draw a 
vertical bar which represents the possible range in which 
the true value (of the angle) could lie. Each point has 
now become 'fuzzy' or 'blurred' in the vertical direction 
(The measurement along the x-axis, viz time, is usu- 
ally very accurate and we do not worry about its errors 
here.) 
Now we can readily see that there is a corresponding 
fuzziness or uncertainty in the curve drawn though the 
points. We have moved from deduct ion to induction. 
Other names for this process are 'inversion' (going back 
from the data to the hypothesis) and 'statistical infer- 
ence. ' 
Going back to Figure 2, why do we choose the curve 
A rather than the curve B? An experimenter would say 
that 'the deviations of curve A from the measurements  
are consistent with the error bars, while curve B lies well 
outside the error bars. 
A 
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Now let us try and be more quantitative. Each error 
bar is really not a line with sharp limits. Larger errors 
are less probable, but not impossible. In fact, Gauss 
himself, building on the work of de Moivre and Laplace, 
proposed that the probability for the error to be x falls 
off proportionally to exp . This is the bell shaped 
graph sketched in Figure A. Box 1 gives a few more 
details about this remarkable, widespread distribution 
which we all call gaussian. The basic message of Box 1 
is that  the error is itself the sum of many smaller con- 
tributions each of which may not have a gaussian dis- 
Box 1. The Gaussian Distribution 
A coin is tossed eight times. What is the most probable number of heads? Four of  course. Why is eight 
heads less probable than four? Because there is only one way to get eight heads, HHHHHHHH. But there 
are 8C4=70 ways to get four heads, since we now have freedom to choose any four of  the eight tosses to 
show heads. The full table of  numbers is 
No. of  heads 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of cases 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1 
and they are plotted in Figure A 
To get the probability, we have to divide by 
256. We have also superposed a bell shaped 
curve. This is how the probability for n heads 
behaves when the number of  tosses is very 
large (of course, we have to relabel the axes if 
we have 158 tosses instead of 8!). This is the 
famous gaussian distribution. Its mathemati- 
cal form is 
P(x)=Aexp ( (x-rn)2~ .;. 
A is a constant of  proportionality. 
x = m is the peak of the curve and also the average value ofx. tr 2 is a constant which is called 'variance'.  
It measures the average of the square of the deviation o fx  from m. 
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But let us 
remember that 
least squares is 
not sacred or 
perfect. It is only 
as good as the 
assumptions that 
went into it. 
tribution. But the sum does approach this law in many 
cases. We can think of the height of the gaussian as 
measuring the number of ways that a given error could 
be built up from the underlying individual contributions 
("errorlets' ?). The logarithm of this number is, there- 
fore, proportional to 
log(exp ( -x  2ai/2a2)) -- constant 
2 Xi 
2a~" 
2 is the average of the square of xi. Why do we take a~
the logarithm? This is a convenient thing to do when we 
want to multiply numbers! Come back to our original 
problem of determining the best orbit (F igure 2). When 
we guess a given curve, A or B, we are automatically 
attributing the deviations of the points from the curve 
to experimental error. So we should be asking ourselves 
- 'What is the probability that the errors took the values 
that we are suggesting?' This probability is obtained by 
multiplying aussian functions for the individual errors 
at each measured point. We now want to maximise the 
joint probability, i.e., the product of probabilities. So 
we maximise the logarithm, which is 
log (Probability of errors) -- 
coast  + another  co .s t  - 
! 
In the simple case where all the ais  are equal, this means 
we have to min imise  the sum of the squares of all the 
errors (because of the negative sign in front of it). This 
is the famous method of least squares, and it is emi- 
nently sensible. It prevents us from doing silly things 
like drawing the theoretical graph well away from the 
points. It ensures that errors have both signs. But let 
us remember that least squares is not sacred or perfect. 
It is only as good as the assumptions that went into it. 
When the errors do not have a gaussian distribution, or 
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when we have some physical imits which restrict our or- 
bit, we can, and must do better. Our example was really 
meant to introduce a broader framework for hypothesis 
testing. 
This broader framework came even before Gauss. It is 
attr ibuted to Bayes and Laplace, who worked in the late 
1700's.! The basic ('Bayesic?') idea is to use a simple 
theorem of conditional probability due to Bayes (Box 2). 
We need it in the form. 
We should warn the reader 
that there are many o/her ap- 
proaches to statistical infer- 
ence. The Bayesean approach 
of this article uses concepts 
closest to enlropy. 
Box 2. Bayes' Theorem for Condit ional Probabil it ies 
One way of understanding this theorem is via 
Figure B in which points stand for events and 
areas stand for probabilities. 
The horizontally' striped region A represents all 
cases or trials in which some event a occured. The 
vertically striped region B similarly stands for all 
instances of b. The intersect ionC o f thesetwo 
regions is cross hatched and represents cases where 
both a & b occured. We can now say 
Area of C =p(a,b) =joint  probability of a and b 
Area of A = p(a) = probability of a 
Area of B =p(b)  = probability o rb  
Conditional probability of a given that b has occured =p(a Jb) 
area of C p(a,b) 
area of A p(a) 
lIence, p(a,b)=p(a [ b) . p(a). Similarly, p(a,b) = p(b [ a) p(b). 
I[ence, equating these two, 
p(a lb)  
p (b la)p(a)  
p(b) 
Since the left side is a function of a for fixed b, we can treat the denominator as a constant, as we have in 
the main text. 
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Probability of H 
(given D) states 
the goal of all 
experimental 
science, viz., we 
are given data, and 
we try to assign 
probabilities to 
different 
hypotheses based 
on this data. 
Probability of H(given D) c~ Probability of D (given H) 
multiplied by Probability of H (not given anything.) 
Our choice of notation is deliberate. H stands for hy- 
pothesis, D stands for data. The left hand side states the 
goal of all experimental science, viz., we are given data, 
and we try to assign probabilities to different hypothe- 
ses based on this data. That is what the notation P(H[ 
D) means. The right hand side of our equation tells us 
how we are to achieve this goal. It has two factors. The 
first one is the conditional probability P(D[H). In words, 
given a hypothesis (orbit in our earlier example) what 
is the probability that the given data could arise (e.g., 
angle measurements of the asteroid)? We have already 
talked about this when we multiplied gaussian (proba- 
bility) distributions for the errors at the various exper- 
imental points. In general, if we know how to predict 
with our hypothesis and we understand our experimen- 
tal errors, we should have no difficulty with P (D[H). 
(And if we don't the first priority is to do so!). Our ear- 
lier discussion stopped at P(DIH ) - which statisticians 
call the 'likelihood function' when regarded as a function 
of H - for fixed D. Of course, it is an honest probability 
distribution for D, when H is fixed. 
But the rules of probability tell us that this is not enough. 
We have to face up squarely to the second factor on the 
right side P(H). This is the unconditional probability 
that a particular hypothesis H is true. Since this has 
nothing to do with the data, it is called the 'prior' dis- 
tribution. Perhaps the philosophy of Kant shaped this 
terminology. He believed that some things like space 
and time had to be given to us 'a priori', right at the 
beginning. We already had some kind of prior distribu- 
tion in mind in our orbit problem. We only drew curves 
like A or B which were based on Newton's laws of mo- 
tion and gravitation, and did not try others. Using P (H) 
to reject what we know to be impossible ven before the 
observations are taken, is a good idea. But P(H) also as- 
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signs different weights to two hypotheses which are both 
possible =to-start with. This seems like introducing the 
experimenters prejudice into the interpretation of data! 
Hot debates continue on this point. The ghost of the 
prior has haunted Bayesian statistical inference from its 
birth. Laplace himself coined a 'principle of insufficient 
reason'. It was a way of making the prior a constant 
or flat function so as to be as even handed as possible. 
This is similar in spirit to our accepting 1/2 and 1/6 as 
the probabilities for coins and dice. But when we come 
to a continuous variable q, going from zero' to one, do we 
say it has equal probabilities to be less than or greater 
than 17 There is a trap here pointed out by Laplace's 
2" 
countryman Bertrand. Why not apply the same (insuf- 
ficient!) reasoning to q2, which goes from zero to one? 
We would then conclude the q would be less than 0.707 
with probability 89 Clearly one needs further input to 
decide on a prior in cases like this. 
So far, we have just touched the fringes of entropy con- 
cept, when we looked at the logarithm of the number of 
ways that a given error could occur. But we are now 
prepared for the basic problem which faced Boltzmann 
when he investigated the theory of gases in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. There is detailed discus- 
sion in the article by Bhattacharjee in this issue, and 
we only give the bare minimum needed for this story. 
Boltzmann would take the total energy and total vol- 
ume of a gas as given - these correspond to the data set 
D. Let us think of the detailed position (x) and velocity 
(v) information of all the molecules as our hypothesis 
H. Boltzmann (and his great American contemporary, 
Gibbs) divided the space of x and v into cells of equal 
volume, measured by the product dxdv. Notice that he 
singled out x rather than x 3, v rather than v 5. This prior 
was based on his analysis of the dynamics of collisions 
between molecules. The rest is history. He was able 
to deduce Maxwell's probability distribution law for the 
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In modern 
quantum language, 
one can state 
Boltzmann's prior 
in a physically 
appealing way. 
Every single 
energy level of the 
whole system gets 
equal probability to 
start with. 
2 Interestingly, this is a product of 
three gaussian distributions for v x, 
vy. v,. 
3 If all the letters were equally 
likely to occur, this number  
would  be W=-26 ~~176 
molecular velocity components v=, vy, Vz. 2 Even better, 
he was able to show how collisions would produce such 
a distribution even if it was not present to start with. 
These results were in full agreement with experiments, 
both earlier and later. In modern quantum language, 
one can state Boltzmann's prior in a physically appeal- 
ing way. Every single energy level of the whole system 
gets equal probability to start with. While Boltzmann 
chose the volume in x - v space based on classical colli- 
sions, today we know that this is equivalent to counting 
energy states in quantum theory. 
We now move forward about half a century to 1948. 
Stimulated by rapid advances in electronics, one of the 
best telephone systems in the world was established in 
the United States. Many of the new developments came 
from the Bell Telephone Laboratories (Bell Labs for short) 
and were published in the Bell System Technical Jour- 
hal. Claude E Shannon, a young researcher at Bell, 
contributed two papers on the Mathematical  Theory of 
Communication. His deep insight was to introduce a 
quantitative measure of the amount of information be- 
ing communicated. After all, this information is what 
we really pay the telephone company for! If you receive 
a message from someone in the English language, you 
already know the approximate fraction of E's, T's, A's, 
etc. Let us say there are a hundred letters in a telegram. 
There is a large number, W, of possible English mes- 
sages with a hundred letters. 3 You open the telegram 
and find out which one of the W is your message. Shan- 
non proposed that the information gained be measured 
by S = log 2 W. The reason for taking the logarithm is 
the same as earlier. Two successive telegrams (on unre- 
lated subjects!) would correspond to W1 • W2 possible 
messages. Shannon's measure nsures that the informa- 
tion (and perhaps your telegram bill!) is additive, i.e., 
S = log 2 W 1 + log 2 W2 = $1 + $2. 
This is related to Boltzmann's entropy. He would call 
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S a measure of your ignorance before you opened the 
telegram, rather than your enlightenment af er you open- 
ed it. But it is sensible to take the two quantities as 
equivalent. 
Why choose 2 as the base of logarithms? The sim- 
plest situations are when the message simply says which 
of two (equiprobable) options was realised. When the 
nurse steps out of the maternity ward and tells the anx- 
ious father 'Its a girl', W=2, and S=I. This is called 
one bit of information. Everyone-in this computer age 
knows that 'bit' is short for 'binary digit', something 
which takes 2 values, zero and one. 
Shannon's concept of information took the world by 
storm. There was tremendous enthusiasm to apply it 
to every field. An indignant journal editor even wrote 
the following lines - "We will no longer consider papers 
with titles like information theory, photosynthesis, and 
religion"! 
We have presented Shannon's work in conjunction with 
the ideas of Bayes and Boltzmann. This attempt at com- 
plete synthesis actually came a few years after Shannon, 
in the influential work of the physicist Edwin T Jaynes. 
He and his followers have explored the application of 
'maximum entropy' (as they call this approach) to a va- 
riety of practical problems. Both Shannon and Jaynes 
Figure 3. The photograph. 
shows the effect of apply- 
ing maximum entropy 
deconvolution to a motion- 
blurred picture. Processing 
by A Lehar and Maximum 
Entropy Data Consultants 
Ltd. for the UK Home Of- 
rice. Our thanks to Steve 
Gull and his colleagues at 
the Mul lard Radio As- 
tronomy Observatories in 
Cambridge who were in- 
strumental in developing 
maximum entropy methods 
for such problems. 
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Figure 4. 
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died recently, living to see their ideas bear fruit over 
nearly half a century. 
Although we cannot give details here, inversion based 
on maximum entropy methods is in wide use. A dra- 
matic real life example (Figure 3) would be a blurred 
photograph of a car. In this context, the blurred pho- 
tograph stands for the data D, while the reconstructed 
picture corresponds to H. After inversion, one is able to 
read the number plate clearly! An example of removing 
blurring in astronomy using prior information is given 
in Figure 4. 
We must of course remember that maximum entropy is 
not a magic wand. The fact that we are able to read the 
number plate means that the information in the data 
(blurred photograph), plus the information in the prior, 
were enough to recover what we were looking for. In 
a given problem, there is usually a range of possible 
priors which would be regarded as reasonable. Most 
workers would regard results which are insensitive to 
choices in this range as genuine. When results start 
becoming sensitive to the prior, it is time to go out and 
get more data or work on a different problem. 
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